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In this issue of the Aviation Watchdog Report, we are delighted to announce the premiere of our documentary series entitled STANDARDS. Read on to learn more about the film, its subject matter, and how you can view it. Our hope is that it will gain a large audience to help us more widely inform the public that the aviation industry has safety problems that need to be addressed. The two-minute documentary trailer can be found here. Sharing this film with those you know will help spread the message and apply much needed pressure to those who must make the necessary changes to protect the flying public.
We have also written two stories covering the legal saga of United States v The Boeing Company. It’s a sad story of corporate greed, government oversight and prosecutorial failures, and the relentless dedication demonstrated by the 737 MAX crash victims’ families. The battle isn’t over as the plaintiffs’ appeal was heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans on February 5, 2026. We anxiously await their decision.
We also bring you an update on several crashes that occurred over the last year as well as a closer look at how complacency represents one of the most dangerous behaviors that threaten aviation safety.
As always, thank you for your interest in aviation safety. Let’s all work together to make 2026 a safe and prosperous year for all.
Captain Edward Smith had a long career at sea. His service covered nearly 40 years including the command of several of the largest passenger ships to sail the world. He was well regarded by maritime employers and passengers alike. As he neared the end of his career he was quoted as saying,
"When anyone asks how I can best describe my experience in nearly 40 years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like, but in all my experience, I have never been in any accident of any sort worth speaking about...I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked, nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort.”
Unfortunately, this tale doesn’t end with a formal retirement ceremony and the accolades of his peers. You see, Edward Smith was the Captain of HMS Titanic on April 14, 1912. Everyone knows how that voyage ended as the Titanic struck an iceberg and plunged to the bottom of the Atlantic. This led to the deaths of over 1,500 passengers and crew, including Captain Edward Smith. Did complacency play a major role in this disaster? It was a shocking event as the vessel was hailed in industry publications as “practically unsinkable.”
Aviation hazards differ somewhat, but the failures that bring down airplanes are not that different from those that sink ships. Financial concerns, schedule pressures, design flaws, judgement errors, and poor or delayed maintenance are hazards often overlooked or downplayed due to complacency.
Merrium-Webster defines complacency as,
“a calm sense of well-being and security: the quality or state of being satisfied, especially: satisfaction or self-satisfaction accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies.”
There is plenty of complacency in the aviation industry that inevitably leads to significant risk. When that risk isn’t addressed then disaster will follow. It’s a well-known problem yet industry leaders often fail to recognize it. Maybe it’s because those very leaders are complacent themselves.
Complacency is an insidious threat, one that is not recognized until it is too late. This happens when safety is taken for granted or placed at a lower priority because nothing bad has happened recently. Since the odds of an accident or other negative outcome is so unlikely the attention is easily directed elsewhere. But that’s where the real danger lies.
Real world examples are numerous and easy to see in hindsight. The FAA ignored the thousands of “loss of separation” incidents that occurred at DCA but did nothing until the January 2025 mid-air collision. Boeing and the FAA were aware of MD-11 engine pylon and attachment point hardware problems as early as 2011 but both neglected to take effective hazard mitigation resulting in the Louisville UPS crash. Aircraft fume events and the negative health effects of the resulting aerotoxic syndrome are obvious to all who are paying attention, yet the airlines continue to ignore the problem. This list goes on and on with many incidents that resulted from known problems, yet no one took action to prevent them. These are clear cases of complacency overcoming effective safety measures. But why do seasoned aviation professionals become complacent?
Human‑factors research shows that complacency is not laziness, it’s a predictable cognitive response to repeated success. The brain conserves effort when tasks become familiar. In aviation, that tendency can erode vigilance, weaken cross‑checks, and normalize small deviations that would have been unthinkable years earlier.
Aviation’s safety record is often described as extraordinary, and rightly so. Decades of engineering advances, regulatory oversight, and safety‑management systems have made flying safer. But that very success creates a paradox: the safer the system becomes, the easier it is for individuals and organizations to drift into a false sense of security. Andy Grove, the legendary Intel CEO, once warned: “Success breeds complacency. Complacency breeds failure. Only the paranoid survive.” His words were aimed at the tech world, but they resonate even more sharply in commercial aviation—an industry where the margin for error is thin and getting thinner.
Complacency rarely announces itself. It emerges quietly—when a checklist becomes routine rather than deliberate, when a maintenance task is performed from memory instead of reference, or when regulatory organizations interpret a lack of incidents as proof that risk has disappeared. In reality, risk is simply waiting for an opportunity.
This is why Grove’s warning matters. His call for “productive paranoia” mirrors the mindset that aviation safety depends on: a disciplined skepticism that asks, what are we missing? What assumptions have gone unchallenged?
Airlines, regulators, and manufacturers build this mindset into their systems through threat‑and‑error management, line‑oriented safety audits, and data‑driven safety programs. But culture matters just as much as process. A safety culture that treats success as a reason to relax is already on the path toward failure. A culture that treats success as a reason to stay alert is the one that prevents the next accident.
In commercial aviation, complacency is not a character flaw—it’s a hazard. Just like any hazard, it must be identified, mitigated, and continuously monitored. Grove’s insight reminds us that the greatest danger often appears when everything seems to be going well. The industry’s challenge is to maintain the vigilance that has made it safe, even when the system appears to be running flawlessly.
Between late 2018 and early 2019, two fatal plane crashes involving the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft occurred. Tragically, 346 people lost their lives. Adding to the devastation was the realization that these disasters were not unforeseeable fluke accidents but were instead linked to a series of deceptive practices within The Boeing Company during the aircraft certification process. On January 7, 2021, the Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to these findings by charging Boeing with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States.
This charge was based on the DOJ’s determination that certain Boeing employees had intentionally misled the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the government agency responsible for ensuring aircraft safety. Because the FAA is part of the federal government, deceiving the agency legally amounts to defrauding the United States government as a whole, which is a federal offense. This gave the DOJ the ability to bring charges against Boeing, officially initiating the case United States of America v. The Boeing Company.
The charge alleges that Boeing conspired to defraud the U.S. government by misleading the FAA during the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX 8. According to the charge, Boeing did so by concealing critical information about a flight control system known as MCAS. This system was later linked to both fatal crashes. Had Boeing been found guilty, it would have faced financial penalties and significant reputational damage, including diminished public trust. But because Boeing is a corporation, not an individual, imprisonment was not a possible outcome.
When the charge was formally filed on January 7, 2021, Boeing simultaneously entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). A DPA is exactly what it sounds like: an agreement that pauses, or defers, criminal prosecution for a set period of time. In exchange, the defendant agrees to comply with certain agreed-upon conditions. If the defendant fully satisfies those conditions, the government agrees not to continue criminal prosecution once the agreement expires. If the defendant fails to comply, prosecution resumes.
There is much to unpack with Deferred Prosecution Agreements, starting with their origin. DPAs have roots in juvenile justice, a context far removed from the corporate use they are most commonly associated with today. To prevent juvenile offenders from entering a “life of crime,” prosecutors developed the idea of a DPA. This served as a mechanism for young individuals to take accountability without permanently branding themselves as criminals. Under these agreements, young offenders admitted their criminal conduct and agreed to follow certain guidelines – usually staying out of trouble – for a set time period. If they complied, the charges would be dismissed upon expiration of the agreement, handing over a fresh slate. Essentially, individuals were told if you admit wrongdoing and get your life together you can walk away in a few years. Many did just that.
As with many well-intentioned ideas, DPAs expanded, eventually making their way into the corporate world. This shift was largely driven by the prosecution of accounting firm Arthur Andersen. In 2002, the DOJ convicted Arthur Andersen of obstruction of justice. The firm collapsed as a result, leaving tens of thousands of individuals unemployed. Public backlash followed, with much of the blame directed at the government. This made prosecutors increasingly reluctant moving forward to pursue convictions that could put companies out of business. So, DPAs emerged as an alternative. This way, corporations could be held accountable but still continue operating. At least in theory.
At first, there were only a few sprinkled into the corporate context. But once the seeds were planted, their use expanded rapidly. And the appeal is there. If companies can acknowledge wrongdoing and correct course, then potentially devastating prosecution may not be necessary. But DPAs have increasingly become a way for corporations to avoid taking a real hit, even in cases involving catastrophic losses, as seen in the Boeing 737 MAX disasters.
Corporations favor these agreements for obvious reasons. No formal guilty conviction. No one goes to jail. No endless media scrutiny. No never-ending trial digging a little too deep. Even when agreements require large fines, those penalties often amount to little more than a speeding ticket for multibillion-dollar corporations. Business resumes as usual, with a few internal reforms. Businesses leap at the opportunity to get their hands on a DPA amid criminal charges.
This brings us to 2021, when Boeing and the DOJ entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement directly following the charge of defrauding the U.S. government. This agreement spans roughly 60 pages. Below is an overview of its key components.
Accepting Responsibility:
First, Boeing formally agreed to, “admi[t], accep[t], and acknowledg[e] that it is responsible under United States law for the acts of its officers.” Thus, any wrongdoing performed by a few employees at Boeing imposes legal responsibility on the company as a whole. Conversely, this structure also allows the company to blame the whole thing on the actions of a few bad actors, potentially concealing deeper issues within the organization.
Nonetheless, Boeing executives acknowledged two of its 737 MAX Flight Technical Pilots– referred to as Employee-1 and Employee-2– conspired to defraud the government. In accepting responsibility for their actions, Boeing accepted a detailed statement of facts as accurate and true. This statement of facts spanned dozens of pages and outlined precisely how the conspiracy unfolded.
Statement of Facts Accepted as Truth:
The story, put simply, goes as follows. Boeing began developing the 737 MAX 8 model amid intense competitive pressure. But before the plane could be flown by a U.S. airline, the FAA had to certify it. This certification includes determining the level of pilot training needed. Full-blown flight simulator training is costly and time-consuming, creating a strong incentive within Boeing to limit differences between the MAX and the earlier 737 model. This way, pilot-training costs can be kept low.
One new feature of the MAX model was a maneuvering system known as MCAS. This system was put in place to automatically push the aircraft’s nose downward when it detected a steep upward pitch, bringing it back down to a safe level.
During the certification process, Employee-1 and Employee-2 informed the FAA about MCAS, but characterized it as insignificant, since the situations in which MCAS could activate were thought to be few and far between. As a result, the FAA assigned a low pilot training requirement, concluding that intensive training was not needed. This outcome pleased the Boeing employees, who were now determined to ensure nothing jeopardized the ranking.
Behind the scenes, however, the scope of MCAS expanded significantly; and the two employees were well aware. In one exchange, one employee wrote to the other, “so I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly).” Employee-1 and Employee-2 knew the FAA had incomplete information, but rather than correcting the misunderstanding, they intentionally withheld and concealed their knowledge of MCAS’s expanded scope. They even went as far as suggesting the deletion of MCAS from all FAA documents, writing to the FAA, “we agreed not to reference MCAS since it’s outside normal operating envelope.” In this email, they deceived the FAA into thinking they had already agreed to remove MCAS mentions from their report. As a direct result of these sorts of misleading statements and omissions, the FAA removed all references to MCAS from their report. This notably left pilots completely unaware of a powerful system in planes they were soon to be flying.
Tragically, on October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed, killing 189 people. The FAA learned that during this flight, MCAS had activated. Boeing Employee-1 and Employee-2 doubled-down on their lie, falsely claiming they were unaware of MCAS’s expanded scope. Then, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed, killing 157 people. MCAS again had activated. Three days later, the 737 MAX was grounded.
This is not a speculative narrative. It is an accurate account of what happened leading to the crashes, an account formally admitted as truth by Boeing.
Monetary Damages
Boeing agreed to pay $2.5 billion in monetary penalties. While a hefty number on paper, Boeing is roughly an $180 billion company, making this fine feel like a slap on the wrist relative to the loss of 346 innocent lives. The damages breakdown is below:
Additional Guidelines:
Boeing also agreed to implement a corporate compliance program aimed at preventing and detecting fraudulent conduct. In doing so, they were required to review existing internal controls and policies plus modify or adopt programs where necessary. The agreement also imposed enhanced compliance reporting requirements, mandating more frequent meetings with the DOJ. Notably, the DOJ allowed Boeing the freedom to select their own compliance monitor rather than appointing an independent one, reasoning that “the misconduct was [not] pervasive across the organization.”
In agreeing to all of these things – responsibility, statement of facts, monetary damages, and guidelines – the Department of Justice agreed to defer prosecution for three years. If Boeing complied fully, the DOJ would not continue criminal prosecution following the term. However, if Boeing breached the agreement, they would remain subject to prosecution. Unsurprisingly, the agreement was breached. This breach and what followed is covered in another article in this edition of the Aviation Watchdog Report.
It is easy to understand why a DPA was attractive to Boeing. They placed blame on two employees, paid a fine, agreed to limited reforms, and evaded genuine accountability for fatal wrongdoing.
On top of that, DPAs are negotiated behind closed doors. This essentially allows facts to be negotiated, without proper or meaningful public opinion and media scrutiny. Proponents of DPAs argue that the DOJ is merely acting as a neutral judge; but in reality, they act as much more than that. They are the judge, jury, prosecutor, and a gatekeeper of information. There is a complete lack of transparency when it comes to these agreements, creating room for deeply flawed agreements.
Had this case instead gone to trial, far more information about what truly went down at Boeing leading up to the crashes would have surfaced. While some investigation precedes a DPA, nothing can match the depth of a full trial, with witnesses and rigorous examination. It is with trials that we get a much more thorough look at what exactly transpired. That level of scrutiny is owed to the public, especially to the families of the victims.
Additionally, on top of everything, both the charge and DPA were filed on January 7, 2021. Ring a bell? This was the day after the January 6 riot at the United States Capitol, an event that dominated news coverage and public attention at the time. Even today, it looms in public memory. Releasing controversial news amid overwhelming coverage of another attention-grabbing event is a well-known media tactic. This is often referred to as “burying the news,” and it appears that strategy was used here. By announcing the charge and corresponding DPA the day after the nation’s capital riot, attention was effectively diverted. This took both Boeing and the DOJ off the hot seat.
The DOJ may frame this agreement as accountability, but in reality, it allowed Boeing to escape meaningful consequences, practically getting away with murder. While DPAs can be effective in certain contexts, their use should be limited to victimless crimes. When human lives have been lost because of corporate wrongdoing, deferred prosecution agreements are simply not enough.
The criminal case against Boeing, United States v. The Boeing Company has felt like a legal letdown from the start. Since its inception in January 2021, real accountability has consistently seemed out of reach. Now, with a pivotal hearing scheduled for February 5, 2026, this long-running case has never been more important to pay attention to.
The previous article on this case traced its origins, including the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) Boeing entered into with the DOJ following the 737 MAX disasters. That agreement was deeply disappointing given the scale of the tragedy, something felt especially deeply by the victims’ families who had been excluded from the entire process.
Crime Victims’ Rights Act
The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) is an essential aspect of criminal cases in the United States. This federal law ensures that crime victims are not sidelined during criminal proceedings– that they have basic rights like the right to be informed of court proceedings, the right to confer with prosecutors, and the right to be heard. More broadly, the CVRA requires the government to treat victims with fairness and respect throughout the criminal process.
But in this case, those rights were not honored. The families of the victims of the MAX disasters were not included in conversations about the DPA. Instead, the agreement was negotiated entirely behind closed doors. The families brought this to the attention of the court, arguing that the DOJ violated the CVRA by not giving them a seat at the table. The judge assigned to the case, Judge Reed O’Connor, agreed.
In October 2022, Judge O’Connor ruled that the families were, in fact, crime victims under the law. To reach that conclusion, the court had to determine whether the families were directly and proximately harmed by Boeing’s charged conduct. Judge O’Connor concluded they were as without Boeing’s fraud, the crashes wouldn’t have occurred. The families were clearly crime victims. Therefore, the CVRA applied, with the judge further ruling that the DOJ had violated it by negotiating the DPA without the families’ input.
That ruling mattered. Now that the families officially had the status of “crime victims,” they had enforceable rights and they wanted remedies for having those rights violated. Some of those requests were granted. Namely, Boeing was required to appear at a public arraignment at the victims request, where they entered a not guilty plea to one count of Conspiracy to Defraud the U.S. Government. Victims and their counsel were also allowed to speak in open court and have their voices heard.
However, families also requested remedies for the DPA itself, as it had been crafted in violation of their rights. They argued that the DPA should be struck down or at least seriously reworked, advocating that it is inadequate as is and was unjustly crafted. Unfortunately, in February 2023, the court denied their requests.
Judge Reed O’Connor’s reasoning was stark. He explained that even if he had legitimate concerns about the substance of the DPA, the law did not give him the authority to substantively review it. No edits or rejections could be made simply because he didn’t like it. In his own words, “no measure of sympathy nor desire for justice to be done would legitimize this Court’s exceeding the lawful scope of judicial authority.” Put simply: even if he wanted to, he couldn't. He believed his hands were tied.
In the U.S. court system, the losing party in a decision is entitled to an appeal. So, if a party dislikes how their case went, they can ask a higher court to review it. This court then has the power to either agree or disagree with the previous decision. Judge O’Connor’s decision was quickly appealed, and this time brought in front of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
But they did not get the result they hoped for. The appellate court agreed with Judge O’Connor’s ruling. They emphasized the importance of separation of powers, reasoning that the executive branch, which the DOJ falls under, handles prosecution, not the courts. It is not the job of the judicial branch to dictate how to go about prosecution.
However, the circuit court made an important distinction. A DPA pauses a criminal case– it does not end it. Prosecution only truly ends if the company complies with the DPA’s terms for the full agreed-upon period. Even if compliance is maintained the whole time, the DOJ still needs to formally file a motion to dismiss the charge at hand. That motion does require court approval. The appellate court reasoned that this later stage is where broader judicial oversight can come into play. At that point, courts may then assess whether the dismissal is consistent with public interest and the CVRA.
So, the court determined that the concerns raised by the families are not necessarily inappropriate, they are just premature. They explicitly write that if and when the government files a motion to dismiss, the district court would be expected to assess the public interest. This statement would later become crucial.
The Breach
Up until this point, the DPA remained in effect, leaving little hope for justice. But on January 5, 2024– just three days prior to the DPA’s expiration– a door plug blew off an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX mid-flight. The nightmarish incident raised immediate red flags within the Department of Justice.
After investigating, the DOJ concluded that Boeing had failed to implement required safety and compliance measures promised under the DPA. The door blowout was evidence of that failure. According to the DOJ, Boeing had failed to establish adequate compliance systems nor a culture of ethics. As a result, the DOJ determined Boeing had breached the agreement, and notified the court that prosecution would resume.
Even then, full-blown prosecution was not in the cards. Instead of letting the case proceed to trial, Boeing entered into a plea agreement with the DOJ. A plea agreement is a deal in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for concessions from prosecutors. This deal requires approval from a judge, so it was handed off to Judge Reed O’Connor for review. While the scope a judge’s authority to scrutinize a DPA is relatively limited, that discretion expands significantly when it comes to a plea agreement. A court may reject a plea agreement if it is deemed inappropriate, overly lenient, or contrary to public interest, among other reasons.
The plea agreement was subsequently rejected by Judge O’Connor, who expressed serious concerns about the leniency of the agreement. The parties were directed to come up with a better solution.
Non-Prosecution Agreements
But this time was different. Instead of negotiating a new plea deal, Boeing and the DOJ worked out a non-prosecution agreement, a deal even weaker than the original DPA.
A non-prosecution agreement, or NPA, is a similar vehicle to a deferred prosecution agreement, with one critical difference: it is never filed in court. With a DPA, a criminal charge is filed into the court system; the government is just pressing pause on prosecution. But an NPA is not even filed in court – it is simply a contract between the government and corporation. A contract. No charge is filed, and no court is involved.
When updating the court that they were continuing with an NPA, the DOJ ensured they had included victims' families in the agreement discussions this time. They assert many families supported the NPA or at least did not oppose it. While acknowledging some families resisted the deal, the DOJ assured their opinions were still heard, but they ultimately believed the NPA was appropriate. The DOJ and Boeing then entered into an NPA largely based on the earlier Deferred Prosecution Agreement.
To make this NPA proper, the DOJ had to eliminate the existing charge against Boeing. So, the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss with the court, asking to drop the charge against Boeing. Dropping this charge would mean Boeing would avoid criminal accountability for conduct that caused the death of 346 people; they’d get off practically scot-free. On November 6, 2025, only a few months ago, the district court granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss.
Judge O’Connor’s reasoning followed a narrow legal framework. In his opinion, he explains that a court may deny a motion to dismiss only if it is clearly contrary to the public interest. That standard, he explained, is met only if the prosecutor acted in bad faith or violated the CVRA.
Bad faith, the court noted, cannot be assumed. It’s innocent until proven guilty. A presumption of good faith must be applied to the prosecutors. So, the court must grant the motion unless it finds the prosecutor is motivated by considerations aside from public interest– like harassing the defendant or accepting a bribe. Judge O’Connor found no such ulterior motives here.
As for the CVRA, the court concluded that the DOJ had complied with the statute by conferring with victims’ families before finalizing the NPA. Families, however, contend the consultation amounted to little more than a formality, noting that key components of the agreement were never disclosed to them.
Judge Reed O’Connor did however disagree with the government on the content of the NPA. He blatantly wrote that “this agreement fails to secure the necessary accountability to ensure the safety flying of the public.” Yet disagreement alone, he said, did not allow him to reject the dismissal. In his view, prosecutors, not judges, must be deemed the best judge of where public interest lies. And because they had not acted in bad faith nor violated the CVRA, the motion to dismiss had to be granted. This, despite it not achieving proper accountability.
This decision essentially handed Boeing a get-out-of-jail free card. But if public interest was really the goal of prosecutors, then prosecution never would have been deferred in the first place, let alone dropped completely. If public interest was really the goal, an NPA giving Boeing a slap on the wrist would not be seen as the best course of action. If public interest was really the goal, victims' families would have had their opinions considered, not just used to check off a required box.
But the fight is not over.
Families have taken advantage of their right to an appeal and asked the higher court to again review the district court’s decision, hoping for Judge O’Connor’s decision to be reversed. In the earlier appeal of 2023, recall that the court had made a key distinction: the request was premature. They explicitly wrote, “if a sought-for final stage is a Government motion to dismiss, we are confident…that the district court will assess the public interest.”
Under the appellate court’s own words, this is precisely the time for public interest to be rethought. The case is no longer premature. It’s ripe.
While the district court did not secure justice for the tragic MAX crashes, the circuit court has the chance to move things in the right direction. The court must intervene to protect the families’ rights, and to protect the broader public interest. Families and counsel argue that Judge Reed O’Connor actually did have the power to deny the motion to dismiss. They explain that when it comes to a motion to dismiss, the court is vested with the power to exercise a level of discretion to protect the public interest. And the public interest is not being looked after properly if Boeing avoids real accountability and meaningful change.
Oral arguments for this appeal took place on February 5th, 2026, in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans. Everyone awaits the court’s decision.
When U.S. aviation professionals talk about our commercial aviation system, they often refer to all aspects as the “gold standard”. This includes manufacturing, certification, maintenance, and operations of U.S. airlines, as well as investigation processes when something goes wrong. After experiencing a string of recent aviation disasters and close calls we are all asking, is the “gold standard” more like copper?
The Foundation for Aviation Safety has just released our first in an anticipated documentary film series entitled “STANDARDS.” In it, we examine the eroding standards that led to the two Boeing 737 MAX crashes, the Alaska Airlines flight 1282 door plug blowout, and other recent aviation disasters involving Boeing aircraft and deficient government oversight.
In the one-hour initial episode, we remember and honor some of those lost in the MAX crashes and hear from their family members who are fighting to save lives by pursuing truth, transparency, justice, and accountability. Their goal is to put a spotlight on the problems that led to the deaths of their loved ones and to fix broken and decaying elements of our aviation safety system. In addition to hearing from family members, we hear from industry veterans about the ongoing certification, manufacturing, legal, and ethical issues that continue to plague Boeing and government investigators and regulators.
In a November 6, 2025, decision, the U.S. District Court in Fort Worth, Texas, ruled that the Department of Justice can drop its previous criminal‑fraud charges against Boeing stemming from the two MAX crashes that killed 346 people. However, in the decision (United States v. The Boeing Company, No. 4:21‑cr‑00005‑O (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2025) (Order), the court stated that dropping the criminal prosecution of Boeing does not protect the public: “Given Boeing’s history related to this case (and the Government’s continued failure to gain Boeing’s compliance), the Movants are correct that this agreement fails to secure the necessary accountability to ensure the safety of the flying public.”
Our hope is that STANDARDS Episode One continues to amplify this concern. Informing the public of critical issues surrounding aviation safety is our core mission. We are proud to serve as the leading aviation watchdog and will continue to report on illegal activities, decreasing safety margins, and other problems impacting safety including ineffective government.
The families of MAX crash victims have appealed the Fort Worth decision. The appeal was heard during a hearing on February 5, 2026, at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans with no decision promulgated by press time.
DCA Midair Collision January 29, 2025- The U.S. government has admitted that both the FAA and the Army “played a role in causing the collision,” citing procedural violations by the air traffic controller and failures by the Army helicopter crew. The government has filed an official response to a lawsuit brought by a crash victim family member. In that filing government attorneys stated, “The United States admits that it owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs, which it breached, thereby proximately causing the tragic accident.” The NTSB conducted a probable‑cause meeting on January 27, 2026, where the Board explicitly blamed the FAA for ignoring years of warnings about hazardous helicopter operations around DCA and for other systemic failures that led to the collision. The NTSB has published the final investigation report that includes 33 recommendations to the FAA, 8 recommendations to the US Army, 5 recommendations to the Department of War Policy Board on Federal Aviation, 2 recommendations to the Department of Transportation (DOT), 1 recommendation to the DOT Office of the Inspector General, and 1 recommendation to the RTCA. This tragedy took the lives of 67 people.
Delta Connection 4819 Toronto Crash (operated by Endeavor Air) February 17, 2025- The 80 people aboard the flight survived though 21 were injured. The Transportation Board of Canada is the investigating body and completed a preliminary report on March 20, 2025. There is no additional information available regarding when the final report will be released, however, these reports typically take 18-24 months to complete.
UPS Flight 2976 Louisville Crash November 4, 2025- The NTSB released a preliminary report on November 20, 2025. This report details the failure of the left engine pylon aft mount connection to the wing clevis. The resulting separation from the aircraft also likely damaged the number two engine due to fire and FOD. The thrust loss from two of the three engines resulted in the MD-11 failing to climb or accelerate thus ending the short flight after achieving an altitude of only 30 feet.
In an investigation update issued January 14, 2026, the NTSB details the bearing race failure on the UPS MD-11 and that a Boeing Service Letter MD-11-SL-54-104-A was issued in February 2011documenting four previous failures of the bearing race. It allowed replacement of these races with the same part numbers and deemed the failures to not pose a safety of flight risk. It’s clear that analysis was flawed. The MD-11 fleet remains flying across the industry with “enhanced inspection” processes in place. There are approximately 100 in service with cargo operations worldwide. UPS has retired their MD-11s. A final report on the UPS crash is likely at least a year away.
Air India Flight 171 Ahmedabad Crash June 12, 2025- The silence from officials in India is deafening and has been since the preliminary report was issued by the AAIB in July 2025. That hasn’t stopped the public outcry, the Indian Supreme Court involvement, and intensive media attention. In fact, it has probably made all of that even more intense. The preliminary report was lacking in detail and due to vague paraphrasing (either intentional or accidental) only ignited more controversy. The AAIB has failed miserably in their public communications.
This pattern of delaying, downplaying, and distraction is not new. This investigation is following the same playbook as the previous Boeing 737 MAX disasters. Blaming the pilots is the easy way out. The messaging from Boeing is that “there is nothing to see here.” In the meantime, the 787 continues to fly around the world and public confidence in the investigation process continues to decrease. The progress of the investigation is unknown and the documented electrical problems occurring on VT-ANB remain unaddressed. This is exactly why The Foundation for Aviation Safety is calling for an overhaul of the international aircraft accident investigation process. The flying public deserves better.
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