Aviation Watchdog Report
July 2026 Edition
Video Cameras in Aircraft - The Blind Spot
Can Cell Phones and Airplanes Get Along?
In The News
Editor, Randy Klatt

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Cover Story

The Dunseith Debacle

When Charles Hoefer purchased an abandoned factory in Dunseith, North Dakota, in 2022, he expected to spend the coming years building recreational vehicles, or RVs. Instead, he found himself at the center of an aerospace controversy that continues to raise concerns throughout the aviation industry.

Hoefer was born and raised in Indiana, what’s referred to as the RV capital of the world. Coming from a family with a long history in RV manufacturing, he followed a similar path. He spent years overseas doing research and development, ultimately returning to the United States with plans to establish a facility to produce high-tech, high-end RVs.

Hoefer was recruited by the North Dakota governor’s commerce team to redevelop a large vacant industrial site in the small town of Dunseith, North Dakota. The building itself was far from move-in ready. Quite frankly, it was deteriorating. The 100,000-square-foot building had been abandoned for years. Mold, trash, deteriorating infrastructure, and unusable equipment filled the factory. Extensive renovations would be required before any RV production could begin.

Despite its condition, the property offered exactly what Hoefer needed: a large industrial footprint at an affordable price. This carried with it the potential to be a highly productive facility. So, in April 2022, Hoefer Group purchased the vacant facility and began the process of clearing out and renovating the building. But within only a few months, issues began to surface. What he and his team discovered during the process would dramatically alter the trajectory of the plan Hoefer had.

The Former Facility

Before its closure, the Dunseith facility had been operated by Benchmark Electronics, an electronics subcontractor that supplied products to Honeywell International. Honeywell, in turn, serves major aerospace customers including Boeing, Airbus, and Lockheed Martin, making the Dunseith facility a part of a broader aerospace manufacturing supply chain. The factory was also home to Chiptronics, Benchmark’s sales arm.

The factory had historically specialized in work related to Honeywell’s GG1320 Digital Ring Laser Gyroscope, a highly sophisticated component used in both commercial and military aviation.

The site ultimately ceased operations in 2015 and was intentionally dismantled in a manner designed to prevent it from ever becoming a competitor. Humidity-control systems were stripped out, decontamination wash stations were rendered unusable, and critical machinery and workstations were removed. Virtually everything necessary to operate and work on the electronics once produced there had been cleared from the facility.

Benchmark relocated its manufacturing operations to Minnesota, while Chiptronics was officially legally dissolved in 2022. As a result, until Hoefer purchased the property, the building stood as an unusable wreck. The prior operation had ended– at least on paper.

Discoveries Begin

As the Hoefer Group began gutting the facility, workers started encountering materials that appeared inconsistent with an abandoned factory. The discoveries became more concerning after an employee recommended by public officials was fired. According to Hoefer, paperwork found on the individual’s desk had the factory’s address, but referenced Chiptronics, Benchmark’s sales arm, despite the company having been legally dissolved.

The documents included recent checks written by Chiptronics. Memo lines referenced items such as “cover repair” and “cover inspection,” while invoices referenced quantities including “288 units” and “500 units”. None of this was related to RV manufacturing. On top of that, the paperwork was dated years after the factory was supposedly closed.

The paperwork appeared to reference Honeywell's GG1320 Digital Ring Laser Gyroscope program.

As the factory clear-out continued, more and more items surfaced. Workers found nuclear files, technical missile specifications, even actual componentry for the GG1320s. Hoefer also has photographs of parcels shown to him by courier drivers addressed to his factory that contained secondary labels directing shipments to local taverns and residences.

In a Foundation for Aviation Safety podcast episode (Episode 30: A Small Town, Global Aviation Risk), Hoefer described the volume of material discovered: “By the time we were done renovating and gutting the facility over about a nine month period, we could have filled an office room to your knees with all the parts, documentation, paperwork and hard drives and other electronic media that we found, much of which relates to the GG1320 gyros.”

The discoveries led Hoefer to believe that aerospace-related work was still continuing at and connected to the factory long after official operations had ceased.

What is the GG1320?

The GG1320 is one of the most critical electronics in commercial aviation. It is the brains behind many critical automated aviation controls. It measures small variances to provide extremely accurate readings for things like positioning and navigation.

Though roughly the size of a hockey puck, each unit is an extraordinarily sophisticated piece of avionics equipment. Valued at approximately $15,000 a piece, these devices are used extensively throughout both commercial aviation and military defense.

The GG1320 demands an exceptional degree of precision. At Honeywell's final testing facility in Minnesota, workers must even account for the Earth's curvature, with the testing floor designed accordingly to ensure accuracy.

The complexity of the device demands strict manufacturing standards, specialized licenses and permits, and rigorous quality-control procedures. These safeguards were designed to help ensure that each GG1320 is properly built, maintained, and introduced into the supply chain with integrity. Any compromise in these standards could have significant consequences, affecting not only the reliability of the system, but of the aircraft that depends on it. If the device malfunctions or provides inaccurate information, the plane can lose its orientation which can have devastating impacts.

Hoefer came to believe that, despite his purchase of the facility, it continued to be used by Chiptronics. The site seemed to be operating as an off-the-books factory where GG1320s were being worked on in a largely unregulated environment. What he had been led to believe was a viable manufacturing facility instead appeared to be at the center of an illicit production scheme. Hoefer contends that the deteriorating facility, and even local taverns, were being used in connection with one of aviation’s most sensitive avionics components. He had been misled about the true nature of the Dunseith factory.

Escalating the Findings

By the fall of 2022, Hoefer had begun contacting authorities seeking guidance on how to handle the materials and documentation being uncovered.

He was referred to a state agent who came to the site and instructed him to hold onto everything they have found and continued to find. Weeks later, additional personnel came and examined the facility. During these interactions, Hoefer was advised it was likely the site contained sensitive materials and had not been properly scrubbed.

One of the individuals who later visited the facility was Homeland Security Agent Daniel Brejo. Brejo told Hoefer that to prevent issues, he should dispose of materials found at the site.  When Hoefer did not do that, Brejo became increasingly aggressive and threatening. Brejo is currently sitting in jail for murdering a federal law enforcement officer, so it’s safe to say these were not empty threats.

Meanwhile, Hoefer experienced a range of retaliation after reporting of his discoveries including the freezing of his finances, and disruptions of his communications and business operations. Ultimately, he got a hold of an official within the Department of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) who advised Hoefer he was probably being subjected to a political and military coverup. The DDTC told Hoefer to continue preserving evidence and report to them.

At one point, Hoefer Group retained an attorney in an effort to clean up the situation. The attorney recommended a strategy known as tightened disclosure. Under this approach, Hoefer would notify the government that the company intended to dispose of the materials after a specific period if no response was received. According to the attorney, providing advanced notice would help limit potential criminal liability should the government fail to respond before the materials were discarded. That way, Hoefer could continue RV production.

Fortunately, Hoefer did not follow through on that recommendation. The materials had been preserved rather than destroyed. It was later discovered that the attorney advising Hoefer Group was also serving as counsel for Honeywell. The attorney was not acting as an independent advisor focused solely on Hoefer’s interests. Honeywell’s name appeared throughout repeated reports to the DDTC, yet the attorney never disclosed his relationship with the company nor the conflict of interest.

Further Attention

Eventually, an FAA National Security Team agent came out to the site to review the situation. According to Hoefer, the agent initially believed he was associated with Honeywell due to documentation indicating he was an authorized aerospace supplier. Once it became clear that Hoefer operated an RV manufacturing company and had no aerospace background, additional federal agencies became involved.

By summer of 2023, action was being taken. Federal officials had collected evidence from the facility, and Hoefer had been interviewed as a witness in multiple investigations.

Over time, additional individuals came forward with information regarding the site. This included former workers in past programs and individuals who alleged observing actual work on GG1320 parts. One whistleblower even gave Hoefer a 150-page document of emails and records including top state officials regarding the scheme.

Aviation Safety Concerns

The significance of the Dunseith Debacle extends beyond questions of misconduct or compliance. At its core, the controversy raises broader questions about aviation safety and the integrity of the aerospace supply chain.

The GG1320 is a critical avionics device used throughout the aviation world. These devices require extremely precise manufacturing, strict environmental controls, and extensive quality assurance to ensure their reliability. Because aircraft systems depend on highly accurate navigational and positional data, any compromise in the handling of these components could have serious consequences.

These concerns come at a time when the aviation industry has experienced a troubling increase in reports involving sudden uncommanded altitude changes. Some of these events have resulted in serious injuries to passengers and flight crews, and in at least one case, loss of life.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety brought this matter to the attention of the NTSB in 2025, introducing them to Hoefer and urging investigators to look into the allegations and potential connections to broader aviation safety concerns.

When these sudden inflight upsets occur, passengers and crew members can be thrown into the cabin ceiling.

These incidents have been attributed to a variety of causes, most commonly clear air turbulence. And, of course, planes can hit unsuspected turbulence. However, there appears to be too many of these incidents for it all to be chalked up to atmospheric conditions.

It is possible that the recent increase of such events could be in part due to defective system parts, like the GG1320. If a significant number of GG1320s were manufactured, repaired, modified, or handled outside approved systems, it could have set off a disastrous domino effect. Given the widespread use of the GG1320, further investigation is a matter of substantial public interest and must be taken seriously.

Even if no direct connection is ultimately established, the allegations surrounding the Dunseith facility raise important questions that deserve answers. There is an abundance of evidence warranting attention, yet many aspects of the controversy remain not only unresolved, but overlooked. Given the potential implications for aviation safety, greater scrutiny of the debacle is warranted. At a minimum, investigators should interview Hoefer, attempt to track down and replace compromised components, and take appropriate steps to mitigate any identified risks.

During the Foundation’s podcast, Hoefer expressed frustration with what he described as a lack of response from the FAA despite substantial evidence. He stated, “All this is backed by data. The FAA knows everything that’s gone on. They know that there’s probably several tens of thousands affected sensors. They know that they can only trace about five or ten percent of those sensors by serial number, at best.”

Hoefer further speculated on how regulators are responding to the issue, stating, “These sensors at 20 thousand hours are supposed to be cycled out, and if I were to speculate, either they’re just working a serious investigation or they are just waiting and hoping they can just cycle everything out without too many accidents or fatalities.”

The Foundation’s Role

Meanwhile, Hoefer has filed a lawsuit against five current and former North Dakota Department of Commerce officials in Federal Court. This marks the largest civil rights action in North Dakota history. The lawsuit alleges the retaliation and coercion he faced connected to his reporting of the materials at the Dunseith facility.

For Hoefer, the entire debacle began with a simple goal: building RVs. Instead, he found himself in the middle of an illicit manufacturing scheme related to one of aerospace’s most sensitive devices.

Video cameras in aircraft

The Blind Spot in Accident Investigations

Uncertainty is a painful thing, and in the context of accident investigations, it can be dangerous. For decades, aviation experts have debated whether cockpit video recorders should be required on commercial aircraft. The disagreement remains unresolved.

Currently, commercial aircraft are equipped with two “black boxes” that record flight information: the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). These recorders assist investigators in determining the events surrounding an accident. The FDR records parameters such as altitude and speed, while the CVR captures radio transmissions, pilots’ voices, and other cockpit sounds. Following an accident, these recorders are recovered and analyzed by the NTSB to help determine the probable cause of an accident. Commercial aircraft are required to be equipped with both devices.

While there are tools in place to record flight data and cockpit audio, there is currently no requirement for cockpit video recording. Whether video recorders should be mandated remains one of aviation’s most debated safety questions.

Cockpit video monitoring was first proposed by the NTSB following an investigation of a 1989 incident at Kansas City International Airport, when a Boeing 737 descended prematurely and struck electrical cables.  In its report, the NTSB recommended the use of long-duration cockpit video recorders, writing “[a]lthough worthwhile information has been recovered from CVRs and sophisticated DFDRs, in several investigations the use of video technology might have complemented data supplied by those recorders and provided valuable additional information to accident investigators."

While this recommendation launched an important discussion, the proposal was not particularly practical at the time. Video equipment in 1989 was large, heavy, and expensive, making widespread implementation unrealistic, and thus the proposal was rejected. Today, however, recording technology has become significantly smaller, more reliable, and far more affordable.  The NTSB has maintained its position that cockpit video recorders should be required aboard commercial aircraft.

EgyptAir Flight 990

On October 31, 1999, EgyptAir Flight 990 departed New York for Cairo. Shortly after takeoff, the Boeing 767 plunged into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 217 people on board. Following its investigation, the NTSB concluded that the crash resulted from the actions of the copilot while the captain was absent from the cockpit.

This probable cause conclusion relied heavily on information recovered from the FDR and CVR. According to the data, the copilot disconnected the autopilot while the captain was out of the cockpit, repeatedly stated, “I rely on God,” and continued making control inputs after the captain returned, resulting in the aircraft pitching nose-down and crashing into the ocean. The NTSB said they found no evidence of mechanical failure and concluded that the accident resulted from the copilot’s flight control inputs.

Egyptian authorities strongly disputed that conclusion, arguing that U.S. investigators relied on speculation to support a predetermined theory while ignoring the cultural context of the phrase “I rely on God,” which they argued is not associated with evil deeds. Without cockpit video, it remains unclear whether there was a physical struggle, if the engine controls were manipulated, and what truly occurred during the final moments of the flight. While a video may not have fully resolved the disagreement, it could have provided investigators with critical context. More than two decades later, uncertainty still surrounds what happened aboard EgyptAir Flight 990.

NTSB Pushes for Change

As a result of the limitations exposed by the investigation, the NTSB sent a Safety Recommendation letter to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) urging the FAA to require cockpit video recorders. The NTSB noted that numerous investigations– including both the 1989 Kansas City incident and the 1999 EgyptAir crash– could have benefited from a capture of the cockpit environment. Twenty-five years after that letter, video recording technology is still not required in cockpits.

The recommendation did, however, prompt a larger conversation within the FAA. The agency initially referred the issue to a special subcommittee, which concluded that cockpit video recording was feasible but that several concerns needed to be addressed before implementation. For years, that remained the FAA’s position: although the technology showed promise, there was insufficient evidence to mandate its use. In 2020, the FAA shifted its position slightly, indicating it agreed that cockpit video recorders do raise significant privacy and security concerns.

Opposition

The strongest opposition has come from pilots’ unions, who fiercely resist the implementation of video recorders in the cockpit. Below are several of the primary arguments raised.

1)    Subjectivity

Pilots’ unions, including the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), argue that cockpit video would add nothing of real investigative value because of its subjective nature. They contend that the current – the CVR and FDR– already provide investigators with the objective information needed to determine the causes of accidents.  

For example, a video may show a pilot reaching towards a switch, but it cannot conclusively demonstrate whether the switch was actually moved. The FDR, by contrast, records whether the switch was actually activated. Critics therefore argue that cockpit video could create misleading interpretations while providing virtually no information beyond what investigations already possess.

2)    Privacy

Opponents also argue that cockpit video recorders would be a significant invasion of privacy. They contend that pilots should not be under constant video surveillance while performing their jobs. They also point to instances in which, despite regulations limiting the release of CVR data, cockpit audio has repeatedly been obtained and distributed by media outlets. Families of pilots have, at times, had to listen to their loved ones’ final moments publicly. Critics argue that cockpit video would only magnify that harm.

3)    Pilot Performance

Pilots also argue that constant video recording could affect their job performance. There is a phenomenon in psychology called the "observer effect", in which people modify their behavior when they know they are being watched. Pilots contend that cockpit cameras could trigger this and cause them to second-guess their decisions or become overly concerned with how their actions will be interpreted, potentially affecting performance. Pilots may instead focus on looking good and playing it safe, out of fear of airlines using video recording against them.

In Response

Subjectivity:

The concerns raised by pilots’ unions and industry organizations are valid, but they also have limitations to them. Cockpit video is not a replacement for FDR or CVR data, but is a supplement to them, simply another investigative tool. While cockpit video alone may not solve every investigative question, combining visual evidence with FDR and CVR data would provide investigators with a more complete understanding of an accident.

Video cameras could also be an aid to pilots. In many accident investigations, pilot error– or even pilot suicide– become the leading explanation. Video evidence could easily exonerate pilots, vindicating them when the cause of a crash is related to mechanical failures or outside factors.

Privacy:

There is no question that cockpit video would involve some loss of privacy for pilots. However, that intrusion must be weighed against the public safety benefits. More complete evidence would improve the accuracy of accident investigations, helping to prevent future accidents and strengthening public confidence in the aviation system. Viewed in the broader context, a limited intrusion to cockpit privacy may be justified by the safety benefits.

Concerns about the public release of cockpit recordings are also understandable. However, this issue is separate from whether the recordings should exist in the first place. If existing protections for CVR recordings have proven insufficient, the appropriate response may be to strengthen restrictions rather than forgo potentially valuable evidence altogether.

Pilot Performance:

Cockpit recording devices would only need to be reviewed following an accident or incident. Rather than viewing cameras as something capable of causing them trouble, pilots could view them as tools that may help establish what truly occurred and potentially clear them of blame. Surveillance cameras already exist throughout society in schools, businesses, and public spaces and transportation. Limited recording in the cockpit for accident investigations would not be out of the ordinary.

Air India Flight 171

On June 12, 2025, Air India Flight 171, a Boeing 787, crashed, killing 260 people. A month later, India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) released its Preliminary Report.

According to the report, the engine fuel control switches “transitioned” from the RUN to CUTOFF position shortly after takeoff. It further states, “[i]n the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.”

That snippet became the focus of public discussion. Many interpreted the limited piece of information as evidence that one of the pilots intentionally moved the switches and caused the crash. This fueled widespread speculation about pilot suicide, rather than possible mechanical issues. As a result, a pilot who could no longer defend himself became the subject of intense scrutiny.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety has continuously raised broader concerns about the investigation. That aside, the preliminary report illustrates how cockpit video could assist investigators. A video recording could help establish whether either pilot physically moved the fuel control switches. The FDR and CVR alone do not provide a definitive answer.

Misinformation and speculation flourish in uncertainty. When the probable cause of an accident remains unclear, harmful narratives and conspiracy theories can quickly emerge, undermining public confidence in aviation and delaying meaningful safety reforms. Mandating the use of cockpit video recorders would not eliminate every unanswered question, but it would help to ensure future investigations are based on the most complete and reliable information possible.

CELL PHONES

Can Cell Phones and Airplanes Get Along?

The cell phone has become so ubiquitous that it seems everyone is always using their phone everywhere. There is a lot of debate as to whether this is a healthy habit or not, but that’s for another story. The real question that many people have is a simple one. Why can’t I make cellular phone calls while flying on a commercial airliner? Am I really going to cause a crash or some other disaster because I want to call my mom? Let’s take a shot at answering all the most common questions passengers might have.

There are several layers to this prohibition on cell phone use. The truth is that worldwide there are some carriers that allow cellular phone usage (foreign carriers) and others that do not. In the U.S. the Federal Communications Commission explicitly prohibited the use via the 1991 regulation 47 CFR §22.925 — “Prohibition on airborne use of cellular telephones.”

In 2018 Congress stepped in and created the federal law that codified the regulation:

49 USC 41725: Prohibition on certain cell phone voice communications
§41725. Prohibition on certain cell phone voice communications


(a) Prohibition- The Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations-

(1) to prohibit an individual on an aircraft from engaging in voice communications using a mobile communications device during a flight of that aircraft in scheduled passenger interstate or intrastate air transportation; and

(2) that exempt from the prohibition described in paragraph (1) any-

(A) member of the flight crew on duty on an aircraft;

(B) flight attendant on duty on an aircraft; and

(C) Federal law enforcement officer acting in an official capacity.

You may be thinking, “why did the FCC require this law and not the FAA?” This is because the FCC is concerned with the entire mobile phone network. When your cell phone is on it is continually attempting to connect to a tower. Imagine planes full of passengers taking off and landing at major airports (cell phones can connect to towers only when at lower altitudes, typically below 3,000 feet) with thousands of phones attempting to connect to towers as the plane is moving at relatively high speed compared to those on the ground. Each phone would be continually bouncing from tower to tower and could conceivably overwhelm, interfere, or degrade the system. There were documented incidents within the cell tower networks prior to the 1991 ban. Since then, the system has become more resilient to interference, but at the same time the number of towers has increased dramatically. The FCC has made the decision to keep the ban in place as a preventive measure. As a sidenote, the FAA has documented over 100 cases involving aircraft radio altimeter anomalies linked to 5G towers located near airports. Mitigation efforts were undertaken in 2023 in coordination with cellular providers and the airlines.  

Beginning in the 1990s, as digital avionics replaced analog systems, aircraft manufacturers introduced increasingly robust protections against electromagnetic interference (EMI). By the mid‑2000s, these protections had matured into a comprehensive, multilayered defense. Critical wiring bundles were redesigned using shielded, twisted‑pair conductors that reject induced currents from external RF sources. Avionics units were enclosed in RF‑tight housings that function like miniature Faraday cages, preventing stray signals from entering sensitive circuits. Every power and data line feeding those systems was routed through filters and suppressors to block high‑frequency noise. Modern aircraft architectures also physically separate critical flight‑control wiring from cabin systems such as Wi-Fi routers, seat power, and entertainment networks, eliminating the coupling pathways that once worried regulators.

These design practices are validated through certification testing. Avionics must demonstrate immunity to strong RF fields, broadband noise, pulsed interference, and lightning‑induced transients. Entire aircraft undergo system‑level EMI testing before type certification. By the time aircraft like the Boeing 777, Airbus A330, and later the 787 and A350 entered service, the industry had effectively engineered away the risk that passenger electronics could meaningfully affect flight systems. This is why, in 2013, the FAA was able to safely permit gate‑to‑gate use of portable electronic devices: the technical foundation for immunity had already been in place for years.

Despite this high level of EMI protection, airborne cellular voice calls remain prohibited in the United States—not because of aviation safety, but because of FCC telecommunications rules. The FCC’s 1991 regulation (47 CFR §22.925) mentioned above bans airborne use of standard cellular devices to prevent interference with ground‑based cellular networks, not aircraft avionics. Even today, that rule remains in force. When Congress enacted 49 U.S.C. §41725 in 2018, it added a second layer of prohibition—this time for cabin environment and passenger‑experience reasons. The result is that U.S. airlines cannot legally permit airborne cellular voice calls, even though modern aircraft are fully hardened against the kind of interference that once justified caution.

With all of this in mind the FAA does set operational restrictions. Phones must be in Airplane Mode, airborne cellular networks are blocked, and it allows airlines to prohibit cell phone calls for cabin environment reasons. No one wants to be on a flight surrounded by a hundred people talking on cell phones. Airplane mode disables the cellular radio signal; this is required to comply with the law. On some phones it will also disable Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. However, those functions can be turned back on manually and most phones now inhibit only the cellular signal in Airplane Mode.

Many foreign carriers do allow cellular phone use in-flight by using onboard systems that limit the power of cell phone output. Installed Picocells act as small cellular base stations and connect to the aircraft’s satellite or air-to-ground link. Your phone sees the picocell as a normal cell tower and connects with minimum power. This system accomplishes two important goals. It allows your phone to connect to a tower without actually using any ground-based towers and limits the power output significantly thereby eliminating any possibility of electronic interference. Even so, voice use is still generally prohibited. U.S. carriers do not use systems like this since cellular use is prohibited by law.

U.S. carriers typically use Wi-Fi systems that connect to the ground through satellite providers that support SMS, iMessage, browsing, and email. Providers include Viasat, Gogo 2Ku, Panasonic, and Inmarsat although this service provider is often transparent to passengers who simply connect to the airline branded Wi-Fi service offered.

In summary, making that phone call to your mom after takeoff won’t cause a major disaster, but it will violate U.S. law and probably annoy everyone around you. Of course, failing to follow crew instructions is also a violation so you might be in real trouble. Passengers have even been arrested upon landing because they failed to follow the personal electronic device policies, procedures, and/or federal statutes. While you’re thinking about cell phones, also be aware of the hazards associated with lithium-ion batteries. Cell phone batteries can overheat and create a fire hazard. Notify a flight attendant immediately should this occur. They are trained to handle this situation and have the right tools onboard such as battery containment devices and fire extinguishers. Additionally, battery banks present an even greater hazard so be aware of the rules for their use. They cannot be placed in checked bags and often must be used only while in plain sight. Now you’re ready for takeoff… as long as that phone is in Airplane Mode.

IN THE NEWS
Boeing Production
Boeing has announced the opening of another 737 MAX production line, this one in Everett, WA. MAX production is currently limited to 47 aircraft per month in Renton, WA. Boeing hopes this expansion will increase monthly production to 63 aircraft and eventually even higher although this will require FAA approval.

Boeing is intending to ramp up Everett production over time while they train approximately 1,000 assembly line workers. Half of these employees are relocating from Renton while the other half are new workers. Fully training this workforce as production increases is a huge safety concern, but not the only one. Certification of the MAX 10 and implementing changes to the engine anti-ice system on new and in-service airplanes remain challenges, not to mention the other 30 or so manufacturing and design defects in the 737 MAX.
K2 Airways 737-400
On July 7, 2026, a K2 Airways 737-400 freighter crashed into the Arabian Sea while flying from Sharjah (UAE) to Karachi, Pakistan. All five crew members were lost after the plane entered a dive from over 36,000 feet. The crew had reported navigation issues just prior to losing control. As reported in the Economic Times, family members of the crew stated the aircraft had an Inertial Reference Unit (IRU) replaced prior to this flight. It is not known if this replacement has anything to do with the crash. Debris has been found; however, the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, along with major sections of the aircraft and crew remains have not been located. The water depth in the area of the crash is nearly 10,000 feet and any effort to locate the wreckage will likely require an international effort. Pakistan has not asked for assistance as of this writing.
Ryanair flight FR1879
On July 10, 2026, Ryanair flight FR1879, operated by Malta Air, departed Thessaloniki (SKG) for Memmingen, Germany. About six minutes after takeoff, while climbing through 15,000 ft, the aircraft’s right CFM56‑7B engine suffered an uncontained failure. Engine debris struck the fuselage and shattered a cabin window, causing rapid decompression and seriously injuring a passenger.

This incident underscores a persistent and unacceptable safety vulnerability in the CFM56‑7B engine nacelle system. This failure closely mirrors earlier CFM56‑7B events: the 2016 Southwest Airlines incident, the fatal 2018 Southwest Flight 1380 accident, and the February 2026 Arik Air 737‑700 blade‑out failure in Nigeria, which also produced containment‑case cracking and structural damage.

Despite this clear pattern, regulatory action has lagged. The FAA’s 2025 airworthiness directive mandating nacelle structural improvements was issued nearly seven years after the fatal Southwest accident, and its compliance deadline—2027—means thousands of 737NG aircraft will continue flying with known vulnerabilities. The Ryanair event demonstrates that the risk is not theoretical and not confined to U.S. operators. With multiple blade‑out failures occurring across different airlines and continents, the slow pace of mandated corrective action is increasingly difficult to justify. The industry has the data, the history, and now yet another serious event pointing to the same failure mode. What remains lacking is timely regulatory urgency. The Greek authorities have delegated the investigation to the U.S. NTSB.
Safety Alert for Operators
In a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO 26002) the FAA is recommending that airlines adopt procedures to ensure the preservation of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data after a reportable incident. This SAFO is a result of NTSB recommendations after the Alaska Airlines door plug blowout investigation. In that case, the CVR data was overwritten before the investigators could access it. Specifically, the SAFO states, “Among the recommendations is one for FAA to require operators of airplanes equipped with a CVR to incorporate guidance into company standard operating procedures, emergency protocols, and post incident and post-accident checklists. These materials would apply to both flightcrew and non-flightcrew personnel and would detail actions to preserve CVR recordings as soon as practical after completion of a flight with a reportable event.”

Most U.S. carriers use CVRs that record only two hours of data before being overwritten. The NTSB has recommended for years that CVRs should contain at least 25 hours of data. EASA has mandated the 25-hour minimum on all new aircraft since 2021, and ICAO Annex 6 also recommends 25 hours. As usual the FAA has been slow to bring U.S. operators up to modern standards. In lieu of real regulatory action, the FAA has chosen to issue this SAFO. Compliance with a SAFO is not mandatory, but only an FAA recommendation.
737 MAX Returns
Anyone interested in buying a gently used Boeing 737 MAX 8? It seems no one is buying these two jets. GOL Airlines has just returned two airplanes (registrations PS‑GRM and PS‑GRN) to the lessor. These are nearly new—they entered service in September and November 2025 and both stopped flying in February 2026. It has been reported that problems with the airplanes originated in the Boeing factory and included CFM LEAP 1B issues and a “center of gravity issue.”  These problems led to much higher maintenance costs and enough frustration that the planes were returned and are likely in line to be scrapped in Arizona’s Pinal Airpark. For more details you can click on this link to View from the Wing.

This comes on the heels of the 787-9 returned to Boeing by United Airlines. United’s 787‑9, N61101, has been plagued by recurring technical problems since delivery, leading to multiple groundings, empty ferry flights, and two returns to Boeing for manufacturer‑level repairs. Aviation outlets such as Simple Flying describe the issues as “not minor” and significant enough to require manufacturer‑level engineering work.

Stephanie Pope, CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) said recently that a priority is “to deliver safe and quality airplanes to our customers on time.” Sadly, that appears to be more of a PR statement than a reflection of reality in the factory.