Aviation Watchdog Report
MARCH 2026 EDITION

For many years, commercial aviation has depended on multiple layers of safety, especially in aircraft design. Structures are expected to handle 150% of their maximum load before failing, a "1.5 safety factor” which has been a core rule for airworthiness since the early FAA and ICAO days. While this remains the official standard for designing and building planes, in reality, the industry is gradually accepting deviations from these, and other norms, and the safety margin seems to be shrinking. When this involves safety practices the likelihood of serious problems increases.

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Editor, Randy Klatt

The Aviation Safety Margin is Getting Thinner

Normalization of Deviance

The Unacceptable Becoming the Norm

For many years, commercial aviation has depended on multiple layers of safety, especially in aircraft design. Structures are expected to handle 150% of their maximum load before failing, a "1.5 safety factor” which has been a core rule for airworthiness since the early FAA and ICAO days. While this remains the official standard for designing and building planes, in reality, the industry is gradually accepting deviations from these, and other norms, and the safety margin seems to be shrinking. When this involves safety practices the likelihood of serious problems increases.

Normalization of deviance is the process by which an organization or group gradually accepts behavior or conditions that deviate from established safety standards, because nothing bad has happened yet. Over time, the abnormal becomes treated as normal. Once a rule is bent or a shortcut is taken it can then become routine. As time passes an organization can forget it’s a deviation at all. It’s the new normal and safety has been compromised with no one taking notice.

Keep in mind that prior to the 2026 DCA crash, U.S. airlines experienced an unprecedented 17 years without a fatal accident. That is an outstanding safety record; however, it is exactly the scenario that would lead to the acceptance of deviance. Also remember that during this time frame there were two 737 MAX crashes overseas. These tragedies should have raised alarm bells throughout the aviation industry. Disappointingly, today we see no substantial change in the safety margin. In fact, if anything it has continued to decrease.

An analysis of current Airworthiness Directives reveals that the commercial airline fleet is plagued with structural and operational defects that should not exist if the engineering and manufacturing standards historically required were adhered to today. The list is long and includes fan and compressor blades made of contaminated alloys, extensive water leaks in electronic bays (a known 787 issue dating back to at least 2016), chaffing wire bundles, horizontal stab trim motor failures, corrosion occurring far earlier than forecast, unauthorized sealants failing, and emergency slide deployment malfunctions to name a few. Even when the FAA issues an AD to address these issues they lack urgency as compliance times are often years in the future. These are only a few of the hundreds of hazards that pose safety concerns but are continually downplayed by industry and only marginally addressed by the FAA.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety has long warned of rising noncompliance with procedures and standards. The FAA’s certification process frequently approves exemptions to existing regulations or simply fails to catch significant problems in design or manufacture. The streamlining of the regulatory process effectively means a less stringent compliance standard. Most notably the 737 MAX’s non‑compliant crew alerting system does not meet modern Part 25.1322 alerting requirements. Even more unimaginable is how the certification of the 737 MAX engine anti-icing, yaw damper, and LRD systems were completed. These systems have serious flaws, and are identified hazards that could result in catastrophe, yet fixes have not been implemented. Somehow, the aircraft was certified, then recertified (after the aforementioned MAX crashes), and today continues in service with these flaws. This insidious degradation of the design standards and the erosion of operational and regulatory buffers is what many experts now describe as a subtle but measurable compression of the overall safety margin in commercial aviation.

The January 2025 DCA midair exposed how ATC staffing shortages, aging infrastructure, and a fragmented oversight culture have collectively thinned the safety margin in the National Airspace System. Chronic understaffing has left key facilities operating with too few certified controllers. This is not a new development, yet the FAA has failed to correct the situation. This is forcing overtime, combined positions, and fatigue‑inducing schedules that erode vigilance. At the same time, outdated radar and alerting systems—modernized only in patches—struggle to keep pace with rising traffic complexity, producing nuisance alerts and reducing the effectiveness of conflict‑detection tools. Layered on top of this, the FAA’s shift to a data‑driven oversight model depends on accurate reporting and strong safety culture, yet at DCA the repeated loss‑of‑separation events were underreported, misclassified, or never escalated, allowing systemic risk to remain hidden. Together, these factors created a brittle environment in which errors propagated further before intervention, ultimately revealing how operational and regulatory buffers have quietly eroded even as the system outwardly appeared stable.

Airlines are always touting safety as a “number one priority.” However, that usually comes after a safety related incident and is used to deflect attention away from what went wrong, specific actions taken to correct the issue, and how they will prevent it from happening again. Formal messaging in day-to-day operations is much more often focused on service-related excellence. Mission statements and PR publications convey similar messages across major airlines. For example, United says they are “Connecting people. Uniting the world." And Delta says “No one better connects the world.”

So, the airlines will connect you to the world. However, the public must assume these airlines make safety a priority since they don’t actually express that sentiment. Of course, lip service doesn’t make an operation safe. But including it in every communication does reflect a higher level of awareness and commitment to safe practices. Instead, the messaging is about service, and the real mission is to be as profitable as possible. Profit is important, but the lack of focus on safety makes profitability much more difficult in the long run.

In recent conversations with airline crews and maintenance personnel, it became clear that some airlines are reluctant to address or share safety issues with employees. Additionally, when crew members do speak up about safety issues they are marginalized and no corrective action is taken. In an organization with a poor safety culture the focus always turns to production. “Get the job done” is the mantra and employees are expected to do just that and nothing more. This can only lead to lower morale and poorer operational performance. This is precisely the opposite of what the airlines want. Rather than acknowledge the safety risks, the culture has accepted those risks as normal.  

Safety is not just a slogan or a reminder at the beginning of a shift to “be safe out there.” Safety success can come only with unyielding vigilance by everyone operating in the system. Accountability must be maintained without exception. Without strong leadership a safety culture will decline, profit margins will become more important, and political factors can have undo influence. Safety isn’t just about following the regulations; it’s about doing the right thing to protect people. Simply adhering to the rules is the absolute minimum. Aviation professionals must be better than that, especially when the regulations are riddled with exceptions, exemptions, and haphazard enforcement.

Civil Accountability

Civil Accountability in the Wake of the 737 MAX Disasters

The Boeing 737 MAX catastrophes have lingered in the hearts of many across the globe, serving as a sobering reminder that prioritizing profit over safety can have deadly consequences. In the wake of these crashes that claimed 346 lives, Boeing has become entangled in numerous civil suits launched by the victims’ families.

While Boeing also faced a criminal charge, that case recently took a disappointing turn when a Texas court dismissed the case in early November. The criminal case was covered at length in our February newsletter. The victims’ families are currently appealing that decision with a higher court. If the dismissal ultimately stands, Boeing will walk away without facing any criminal accountability for its despicable conduct. However, the company is still facing a different form of accountability through the civil court system.


Criminal vs. Civil Cases


Although criminal and civil cases may look similar in their structure, they serve very different purposes. Criminal cases occur when the government brings charges against an individual or organization for violating the law. In the Boeing matter, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Boeing with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Criminal prosecutions are meant to enforce laws.

Civil cases, on the other hand, exist to resolve disputes between people or institutions. Rather than seeking punishment, these cases are primarily concerned with recovering damages for those who were harmed by wrongdoing. In the context of the MAX crashes, this means that instead of the government going after Boeing, the victims’ families themselves bring claims against the company. These cases do not carry criminal labels. Instead, they focus on compensation, accountability, and for many, a measure of closure amidst their grief.

Civil lawsuits follow a relatively structured process. The person launching the lawsuit, known as the plaintiff, files a complaint against the party that has wronged them, known as the defendant. From there, the case moves through a series of pretrial proceedings which work to prepare both sides for trial. During this stage, the parties exchange evidence, argue about what information can and cannot be brought up, and clarify some of the legal issues that the jury or judge will ultimately decide. Courts also strongly encourage the parties to make genuine attempts at settlement during this stage. If a settlement cannot be reached, the case then proceeds to trial.

Civil trials themselves are typically divided into two major phases. The first phase addresses liability. Before anything else, the jury – or judge, in a non-jury trial – must determine whether the defendant is legally responsible for the harm alleged by the plaintiff. If the jury finds they are not liable, the case ends there. Full stop. But, if the jury determines that the defendant is responsible, the trial moves into the second phase: damages. At that point, the focus shifts to determining the proper compensation the plaintiff should receive for the harm suffered.


MAX Crash Civil Litigation


Following the MAX disasters, dozens of civil lawsuits were filed by victims' families. In their complaints, families outlined the actions they believed led to their loved ones’ deaths and laid out the legal basis for their claims. Common allegations made by the families include wrongful death, negligence, and products liability. These causes of action form the foundation for holding Boeing liable and determining what compensation the families may be entitled to receive.

Because of the heavy lawsuit load stemming from the second MAX crash, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the cases were consolidated in federal court. Consolidating cases allows the litigation for related cases to be handled more efficiently. Rather than having dozens of separate lawsuits move independently through the same lengthy pretrial process, the cases could move forward together for pretrial matters while still allowing each family to ultimately have their own trial or settlement. It was within this consolidated litigation that a major milestone occurred.


The Stipulation


In 2021, Boeing and the families (all but two) of the ET302 victims entered into a stipulation as part of the pretrial proceedings. A stipulation is essentially a binding agreement between parties about certain facts or issues with a case. This particular stipulation resolved several important matters. It confirmed the cases would all be heard in the Northern District of Illinois, and ensured that each plaintiff would be entitled to pursue full compensatory damages.

Most significantly, in this stipulation, Boeing agreed to accept sole liability for the crash. In the company’s own words, “Defendant the Boeing Company admits that it accepts responsibility for the crash of Flight ET302, which caused the deaths of all onboard.” By making this admission, Boeing acknowledged that it alone was responsible for the damages owed to the victims’ families. Completely and exclusively.

Recall that liability is a key aspect of civil cases. Once liability is determined, the case moves onto determining proper compensation. So, having the plaintiff admit to liability streamlines the case, cutting the most contentious part out. With liability not up for question, compensation is the whole focus.

At the beginning of each trial, juries are therefore instructed that Boeing’s liability has already been established. They are told their role is not to determine whether Boeing is responsible for the crash, but to decide the appropriate compensation. Damages, as specified in the stipulation, include but are not limited to things like loss of economic support, burial expenses, and the sorrow and mental suffering experienced by family members as a result of the death of their loved ones. By eliminating the need to question liability, the process was simplified, allowing families to focus on the losses they endured rather than battling over fault.

What’s the catch? Boeing’s decision to admit liability may not have been purely an act of goodwill, but instead a strategic move for the company. If liability had remained contested, the trials would have permitted and required extensive evidence about Boeing’s conduct leading up to the crashes. Internal communications, engineering decisions, certification issues, and plenty of other potentially damaging information could have been presented in open court, rather than swept under the rug. By removing this possibility and accepting responsibility, Boeing avoided the disclosure of damaging information and limited the scope of what would be discussed at trial. In doing so, Boeing can control the public narrative and present itself as a company that has accepted responsibility and encouraged families to seek compensation.

The stipulation also included another important limitation: families agreed not to pursue punitive damages in their cases. Unlike compensatory damages, which are meant to reimburse victims, punitive damages are designed simply to punish defendants and deter future misconduct. Removing that possibility significantly reduced Boeing’s financial exposure in the litigation.


Contesting the Recoverable Compensation


This ruling acknowledged the grim reality of the crash. Evidence indicated that the aircraft maneuvered violently for several minutes before eventually plunging into the ground. For families, this decision meant that juries could consider the suffering their loved ones likely endured – moments that families have replayed and reimagined over and over.

Fortunately, the court firmly rejected this shameful suggestion. It ruled that families could seek damages for the pain and terror the victims likely experienced during the final moments of their lives. As the court explained, “a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that will be presented at trial that the passengers on ET302 perceived that they were going to crash, horrifically, to their certain death.”


Adding insult to injury, in 2023, Boeing attempted to prevent families from recovering damages related to the emotional distress their loved ones may have faced during the flight that ended their lives. The company argued that the law says this type of compensation should only apply for the conscious pain and suffering as a result of an injury. Because the passengers died immediately upon impact with the ground, there was no after. Under this reasoning Boeing suggested that any claim that passengers experienced terror during the flight would be speculative. Therefore, Boeing’s attorneys argued, it should not be relevant for calculating damages.


Settlements


Paul Njoroge, who lost his wife, mother-in-law, and three children, described the thoughts that remain with him in a statement shared by the law office representing him. "I stay up nights thinking of the horror that they must have endured as pilots struggled to keep the plane flying for six minutes,” he said. “The terror that my wife must have experienced with little Rubi on her lap, our two children besides her crying for their daddy, and my mum-in-law feeling helpless beside her. The six minutes will forever be embedded in my mind. I was not there to help them. I couldn't save them."

Ultimately, Njoroge reached a settlement with Boeing only days before his trial was scheduled to begin.

The vast majority of cases stemming from the crash have been resolved through settlements rather than trials. Settlements allow the parties to resolve the disputes privately without the uncertainty and emotional toll of a courtroom battle. Compensation is determined through a binding agreement, rather than a verdict. The terms of the settlements have remained largely confidential. In many instances, agreements were reached shortly before trial– sometimes even just hours before proceedings were set to begin.

Still, a few cases have gone before juries. The first ET302 case to reach trial was the case of Shikha Garg. Garg was a consultant for the United Nations Development Program and was traveling to Kenya for a UN environmental assembly when she boarded the Boeing 737 MAX-8. She was an accomplished professional and had gotten married only a few months before the flight. After hearing the case, a jury awarded her family $35.8 million in damages.

To date, approximately 90% of the lawsuits stemming from the devastation have been resolved through settlement. However, several cases remain unresolved and ongoing. Boeing’s civil accountability for the crashes is still unfolding.

Flying with Children

Flying with Children - Part II

In the April 2025 edition we wrote about travelling with children concerning their safety while in their seats. Subjects included using car seats, flying with “lap children,” (the Association of Flight Attendants has opposed allowing small children to sit on parent’s laps for decades) and using other restraint devices based on the child’s age. Click here to read that story.

This article covers additional topics that are important to families planning to fly with young children or putting them on an airline flight unaccompanied. Both scenarios happen many times every day, but both require a lot of planning beforehand.


Sitting With Your Kids


For parents, and most adults, it would seem a “no brainer” that federal law would require that children, specifically those 3-11 years old, be seated with their parents or guardians when flying together. Imagine the potential disruption, emotional distress, and safety impacts resulting from a 3-year-old child being separated from their parents on a plane full of strangers. An unthinkable scenario to be sure. Actually, it is not that uncommon and there are no regulations to prevent it from happening.

The FAA and their parent agency, the DOT, publish only guidance information. Even though a separated child poses a plethora of potential problems for crew members as well as other passengers, there is no requirement for airlines to ensure this doesn’t happen. The DOT does offer a Family Seating Dashboard intended to provide families information about flying with children, specific airline commitments to keeping families together, airline Customer Service Plans, and Tips for Families. However, these are simply practical tips and airline best practices, they are not required by law.

As for future federal regulation, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 provided that the Secretary of Transportation “shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish a policy” that directs assigned seating air carriers to seat young children, under 14 years of age, adjacent to an accompanying adult to the greatest extent practicable, if the adjacent seats are available any time after the ticket has been issued, but before the first passenger boards the flight. Additionally, the Reauthorization Act also prohibits air carriers from charging a fee or imposing an additional cost beyond the ticket price to provide this service. This rulemaking became a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on October 8, 2024. This is the good news. The bad news is that the DOT is still in the review-revision phase for this rule and no enforcement authority exists. In the meantime, the DOT can only provide guidance with policy recommendations such as, “The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) encourages all airlines to guarantee that young children are seated adjacent to an accompanying adult without charging any additional fee.” As of today, only half of the ten largest U.S. airlines have committed to this policy voluntarily. In other words, the DOT does not require any airline to comply with this “guidance.”

Source: https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/airline-family-seating-dashboard

Booking flights well ahead and choosing seats for the entire family remedy some of these problems. However, there are times when inclement weather or other operational challenges result in cancelled flights and subsequent rebooking. This can be very tough for parents who are flying with young children. As you can imagine, these situations often mean hundreds of people at the airport are attempting to rebook and available seats may be at a premium. Ensuring you not only book the new flight for everyone, but that you are seated with your youngsters isn’t always an easy task. Be clear with the booking agent right up front—you must sit with your kids. Booking agents and gate agents can make this happen in nearly all cases. Assigning new seats for other passengers to accommodate a family may not be easy, but it can be done.

Of course, this has been made more difficult by the airlines’ fee structure. Passengers are now paying extra for exit rows, additional legroom, or even aisle or window seats. Gate agents will have to shuffle seating around and risk angering those passengers that are moved. The airline can provide vouchers or other incentives, but this is often not done or simply too much work to accomplish in a short time frame when operational tempo is high. It isn’t the easiest thing to do, but it is obviously the right thing for parents and airlines.

Don’t wait until you’re boarding the new flight to act. Flight attendants will surely do what they can, but it does become more challenging given how contentious a full airplane of tired or frustrated passengers can be. If you have your hands full with kids, the last thing you want to do is ask other adult passengers if they will move seats to help you. Most people will accommodate; however, there are always those who will refuse or even raise a complaint.


Unaccompanied Children


Airlines also have varied policies regarding unaccompanied children. Again, there are no federal regulations on this topic. Most airlines offer unaccompanied minor services for kids starting at age 5 and ending at age 11-14 depending upon the carrier. These services include an escort to the gate, in-flight monitoring, and an escort from the aircraft to a waiting adult. These are services that must be arranged well in advance and vary greatly between airlines. Some airlines offer this on non-stop flights only, others on transfers but only involving their airline. These services also come at a cost that ranges from $50-$150 each way.

The child’s safety is obviously the most important factor. Consider if your child is old enough and mature enough to handle the experience. Although flight attendants are responsible for monitoring unaccompanied kids, they also have a full airplane of adults to take care of. Given the problems we see during ground evacuations it is vital that children flying alone must understand what to in an emergency. There is no substitute for a responsible parent sitting next to a small child when something unexpected happens.

Flying unaccompanied can be a wonderful experience for children. The independence gained is exhilarating and can provide confidence and positively impact the way a child views the world. Of course, the opposite can happen after a difficult trip. Planning these excursions well in advance and fully understanding all your airline’s policies and procedures is vital to ensure the trip goes well for everyone including the child, the airline, and the parents. Check out additional tips provided by the DOT on their Tips for Families and Links to Airline Webpages.

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ET302

Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Remembered

March 10th marked the seven-year anniversary of the 737 MAX crash in Ethiopia that took 157 lives. We remember and honor those lives, along with their families on this difficult anniversary.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety continues to work with many of the family members, who courageously fight for aviation safety by pursuing truth, justice, and accountability. We want to extend our thanks and appreciation to all of them for their tireless efforts to save lives.

Boeing

Class Actions Against Boeing Move Forward

Legal troubles for Boeing continue. On March 17, 2026, a federal judge in Chicago certified a shareholder class action that accuses Boeing of concealing safety problems in its 737 MAX aircraft prior to the two crashes in 2018 and 2019. This decision allows shareholders to sue as a group if they held stock between November 7, 2018, and October 18, 2019.

Boeing is also facing another class action lawsuit in Virginia federal court claiming similar misrepresentations about the MAX prior to the January 2024 Alaska Airlines door plug blowout.